The Uses of Sovereignty in Twenty First Century Russian Foreign Policy by Deyermond, Ruth Margaret
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1080/09668136.2016.1204985
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Deyermond, R. M. (2016). The Uses of Sovereignty in Twenty First Century Russian Foreign Policy. EUROPE
ASIA STUDIES, 68(6), 957-984. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1204985
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
1 
 
The uses of sovereignty in 21st century Russian foreign policy  
Of all the areas of friction between Russia and the US (and its allies), few are proving to be more significant 
than the dispute over sovereignty – its meaning and its limits. A radical rethinking of the theory and practice of 
sovereignty in the post-Cold War world, informed by the liberal political values deriving from the hegemonic 
influence of the US, and evident in several US-led interventions, has called into question the primacy of state 
sovereignty in contemporary international relations. Outside the boundaries of the former Soviet Union, Russia 
has responded by strongly reasserting the principle of state sovereignty as the basis of international law and 
international relations.  
At the same time, however, Russia has shown an entirely different approach to state sovereignty within the post-
Soviet space. Russia has demonstrated a fundamental disregard for the state sovereignty principle in its 
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states in 2008 and its incorporation of Crimea in 
2014, in both cases despite the opposition of the states (Georgia and Ukraine) in which these regions were 
located. This clearly contradicts the Russian position on state sovereignty in relation to Iraq, Serbia, Syria, and 
other cases, and which is set out in key policy documents and governmental statements.
1
 
While this is obviously a significant inconsistency in the Russian view of sovereignty, it would be wrong to 
assume that this is either a mistake or a recent development. Analysis of key Russian foreign policy documents, 
statements by Russian governmental actors, and Russian diplomatic and military activity suggest that although 
the content of sovereignty varies across cases in Russian foreign policy, any characterisation of the 
differentiated Russian approach as merely inconsistent and hypocritical misses the core function of sovereignty 
in Russian foreign policy.  Outside the region of the former Soviet Union, a ‘Westphalian’ state sovereignty 
model – where mutual recognition of sovereignty by states and acceptance of the principle of legal equality of 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 5 February 2010, available from: 
http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461, accessed 16 October 2012; Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii, 15 July 2008, available at: http://kremlin.ru/acts/785, accessed 28 August 2014; Kontseptsiya 
vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 12 February 2013, available at: 
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/nsosndoc.nsf/e2f289bea62097f9c325787a0034c255/c32577ca0017434944257b1600
51bf7f!OpenDocument, accessed 31 July 2013; Statement at the 67
th
 Session of the UN General Assembly, 28 
September 2012, available at: http://russiaun.ru/en/news/ga_lavrov_67, accessed 22 May 2014. 
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states are both assumed – is evident in Russian foreign policy.2 Inside it, however, the approach combines the 
legacy of Soviet ideas about state sovereignty with a discursive adaptation of the ‘post-Westphalian’ model that 
has underpinned debates about Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and intervention since the late-1990s.
3
  
 
This article suggests that the principal significance of the idea of sovereignty in Russian foreign policy in the 
21
st
 century is instrumental, not ideational – in other words, that although ideas about the character of state 
sovereignty have been set out frequently by members of the Russian political elite in speeches, interviews, and 
other public forums and appear to be central to the articulation of Russian foreign policy in official documents, 
their primary purpose is to advance particular elements of Russian foreign policy rather than to develop a 
consistent position on sovereignty which would inform governmental practice. As a result, this article also 
suggests that while Russian governmental discourse and practice in relation to state sovereignty has not been 
consistent in its content across time or cases, it has been consistent both in its functions and in its differentiation 
between states outside and inside the post-Soviet space. It is possible to identify what could be characterised as 
two working models of sovereignty in Russian foreign policy: a ‘Westphalian’ and a ‘post-Soviet’ approach. In 
both approaches, the point of sovereignty ideas in Russian foreign policy remains the same: to enhance Russian 
security; to challenge, at both conceptual and practical levels, US primacy and the extension of influence in the 
post-Soviet region by the US and its ‘Western’ allies;4 and to enhance Russia’s position as both a regional 
power and a significant power in an emergent multipolar order.  
                                                          
2
 This article does not, of course, suggest that ‘Westphalian’ sovereignty is a concept explicitly adopted in 
Russian foreign policy discourse; rather, it suggests that the term – widely, if not unproblematically used in 
Western International Relations theory – describes one of the positions adopted on sovereignty by the Russian 
government. 
3
 The term ‘post-Soviet’ is used here to refer all the successor states of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
(USSR) other than the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) which, as members of both the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU), have political, economic, and security 
relationships to Russia, the rest of Europe, and other parts of the former Soviet Union, that are radically different 
from the other Soviet successor states’ relationships to these actors.  
4
 Although problematic in several respects, the term ‘West’ is used here to refer to the US and its European 
allies (members of NATO or the EU) because it is a term widely used by the actors themselves, including 
members of the Russian political elite. 
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This article, then, argues that a dual approach to state sovereignty – Westphalian sovereignty outside the region 
of the former Soviet Union and a post-Soviet model inside it – performs  three functions in contemporary 
Russian foreign policy: firstly, it helps to secure Russian national interests at domestic, regional, and 
international levels; secondly, it acts as a form of balancing against the US and its allies, the states Russia most 
strongly associate with the shift towards a post-Westphalian model of sovereignty; and thirdly, it acts as a 
marker of ‘non-Western’ power identity in an emergent multipolar order. Given the variety and strength of 
domestic and international interests at stake, Russia is unlikely to abandon its use of a dual approach to state 
sovereignty in the near term, which means that the concept and practice of state sovereignty will continue to be 
a source of dispute between Russia and the West. However, the conflict between these two models, while 
effective in advancing the two objectives of national interests and balancing in the short term, is likely to cause 
significant problems in the longer term for the third objective because of the concerns of other group members, 
above all China. Since this objective intersects with the others, the friction produced by differences between 
these two models represents a challenge for Russian foreign policy in the longer term. Thus both the disputes 
between Russia and the West over sovereignty and the tension between Russia’s own working models of 
sovereignty are likely to remain significant sources of instability and uncertainty in global politics. 
 
The sovereignty problem 
Sovereignty emerged as a particular issue of dispute between Russia on the one hand and the US and its allies 
on the other, at the end of the 1990s and grew significantly in the first decade of the 21
st
 century. While the 
Russian government’s position on sovereignty was one aspect of a broader shift towards foreign policy 
assertiveness, the dispute itself is, to a significant extent, a product of the deeply contested shift in Western and 
international institutional understandings of, and discourse about, sovereignty in this period.  
Following a series of cases when the international community failed to act (or to act in a timely fashion) in 
response to gross human rights violations, and after the 1999 military intervention in Kosovo, debates about 
humanitarian intervention led to a reconceptualization of the role and meaning of sovereignty. This re-
evaluation appeared to critics to pose a serious challenge to the foundations of international law, the conduct of 
peaceful inter-state relations, and to the possibility of global governance through international institutions 
because it challenged the traditional primacy of the sovereign state in international relations.  
4 
 
Recognition of state sovereignty, in this new conception, was understood to be contingent on the conduct of 
states towards their populations. Whereas traditional conceptions (Hinsley 1966, James 1986) emphasised the 
state as the ultimate holder of sovereignty and, in consequence, viewed sovereignty as unrelated to the conduct 
of states within the legally recognised boundaries of their territories, these new conceptualisations located 
sovereignty, ultimately, with the populations of states, rather than the states themselves. In Kofi Annan’s well-
known assessment, ‘state sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined […] states are now widely 
understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa’ (Annan 1999). Given the 
responsibility of the international community to prevent serious human rights abuses, and the seemingly 
increased willingness of some states and international organisations to intervene in other states to achieve this, 
the external dimension of sovereignty – a state’s sovereignty in relation to external actors – thus became 
explicitly dependent on external perceptions of a state’s domestic conduct.  
This shift in thinking about sovereignty was central to the development of the R2P concept, later accepted in 
modified form at the 2005 World Summit.
5
 Although not envisaged by its promoters primarily as a challenge to 
state sovereignty, a weakening of the state sovereignty principle was generally understood to be implicit in R2P, 
and concerns about this formed the basis for Russian and Chinese objections to its reaffirmation via a 2005 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution (Bellamy 2010, p. 145).While analysts have debated the 
extent to which this was new to R2P given the pre-existing powers to intervene under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter (Hehir 2010); the continued requirement of UNSC authorisation for any military intervention; and 
historic understandings of the responsibilities associated with state sovereignty (Glanville 2011), and despite 
Glanville’s (2013) challenge to the idea that the ‘traditional’ state sovereignty norm in respect of intervention is 
as long-standing as commonly asserted, the perception of many actors involved in the debate about R2P was 
that it signalled a new willingness to set aside the state sovereignty principle in international affairs. This 
perception – evident amongst both proponents and critics of R2P – drove both the debate about the principles of 
sovereignty and intervention, and the response to intervention in practice. 
Although this rethinking of the concept of sovereignty was international in character, and its most important 
articulation was in the documents and structures of the United Nations (UN), the principle and, in particular, the 
                                                          
5
 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, 24 October 2005, available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/World%20Summit%20Outcome%20Document.pdf#page=3
0, accessed 18 April 2014. 
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practice invoking the principle was, for Russia and a number of other states, strongly associated primarily with 
the United States acting in its capacity as global hegemon and standard bearer of liberal political values, and 
secondarily with its Western allies. This was evident despite the fact that as Allison (2013b, pp. 65-66) notes, 
US government concerns about R2P and its potential to both limit desired US action and compel its involvement 
in unwanted interventions contributed to the weaker, modified variant accepted at the 2005 World Summit. Both 
this association and the shift in sovereignty thinking itself can be traced to the development of an international, 
liberal order under US hegemony, most notably developed in recent literature by Ikenberry (2011). Rejection of 
the automatic primacy of state sovereignty relative to the rights of the individual; the responsibility of the state 
to the individual; and the responsibility of an international community of states to assist in the protection of 
human rights within states – if necessary, without those states’ consent – are all clearly liberal in character. 
Thus, the emergence of ideas challenging the primacy of state sovereignty was linked to the growing importance 
of liberal political ideas and, in consequence, to the global dominance of the liberal hegemon after the end of the 
Cold War 
The association between the US as hegemon and the perceived conceptual and practical erosion of state 
sovereignty as a foundational principle of inter-state relations was reinforced by the case of Kosovo and by the 
invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. The 2003 invasion of Iraq raised significant questions about the status 
of international law and state sovereignty in a US-led, liberal order. Although not an action that fell within the 
parameters of R2P, the principle was invoked in relation to it by participants (Bellamy 2010, p.152); as the then-
US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice observed in 2009, this appropriation of R2P to justify the Iraq War ‘still 
casts a shadow on efforts to deepen the consensus around the R2P concept’.6 Significantly, it appeared to 
indicate, as with Kosovo four years earlier, that the US and its allies were willing to disregard the UNSC, 
international law, and the primacy of state sovereignty while citing humanitarian reasons for doing so. After the 
invasion, the repeatedly-stated aim of the US and UK governments to ‘return sovereignty to the people of Iraq’ 
or George W. Bush’s pledge to ‘transfer full sovereignty’ to the Iraqi president (US Department of State 2004) 
reinforced the impression that sovereignty was a condition that could be removed or restored to populations and 
                                                          
6
 Remarks by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative, on the UN Security Council and the 
Responsibility to Protect, at the International Peace Institute Vienna Seminar, 15 June 2009, available at: 
http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2009/125977.htm, accessed 21 March 2015. 
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governments of weaker states by the hegemon, and that state sovereignty was, in consequence, becoming a 
fragile and threatened principle.
7
 
Tensions over the divergent views about the sources and primacy of state sovereignty manifested themselves 
most acutely in relation to the case of Kosovo. Predating the formalisation of the R2P principle, and different 
from it in conception,
8
 the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo nevertheless seemed to critics to demonstrate the 
problems with this model of intervention, since the US and allies appeared both to break international law by 
bypassing the UNSC and to disregard Serbian sovereignty. As analysts have noted, intervention in Kosovo was 
seen by Russian political elites as an attempt to pursue NATO, and specifically US, interests using the pretext of 
humanitarian intervention (Averre 2009 p.581, Asmus 2010, p.91). The military intervention itself was, 
however, a less significant threat to the sovereignty principle than the 2008 recognition of Kosovo’s 
independence by the US, its allies, and others. Advocates for Kosovo’s independence argued that Serbia had 
forfeited the right to territorial integrity because of the Serbian government’s conduct in Kosovo. Significantly, 
for Charles Kupchan (2007), the forfeiting of sovereignty over Kosovo also had a punitive function; loss of 
territorial integrity was viewed as the punishment for ethnic cleansing and other actions by Serbian nationalists 
and as a warning to Serbians to move to the political centre ground. Debates about the future of Kosovo 
highlighted the sharp disagreement between proponents of Kosovo’s independence, who argued that Kosovo 
was an exceptional case and thus not one that undermined the state sovereignty principle, and those, including 
members of the Russian government, who disputed the exceptional status of the Kosovo case and viewed 
recognition of its independence as an assault on Serbian sovereignty and on state sovereignty as a structuring 
principle of international order.  
                                                          
7
  On Bush’s promise to the Iraqi president, see Remarks by the President and Prime Minister Blair of the 
United Kingdom in a Photo Opportunity, 9 June 2004, available at: 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/33338ptf.htm, accessed 2 December 2004. On the transfer of sovereignty back 
to the Iraqi people see, for example, PM Welcomes Iraqi Governing Council Announcement, 
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/print/page4842.asp; Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 21 
April 2004, http://www.state.gov/p/31719.htm. 
8
 As Evans (2008, p.285) and Hehir (2010, p.224) suggest, Responsibility to Protect developed precisely in the 
context of many states’ dissatisfaction with the model of humanitarian intervention utilised in the Kosovo case 
and from the perceived need to formulate an alternative international response to humanitarian crises.  
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By the end of the first decade of the 21
st
 century, then, a shift in the sovereignty norm, widely understood to be 
formalised in the R2P principle, linked by actors to interventions in Serbia and Iraq, had challenged the accepted 
position of state sovereignty in the international political and legal order. Although reflecting the shared view of 
many in the West and elsewhere, for opponents of this change – most notably Russia – this shift was principally 
associated at both conceptual and practical levels with the political values and foreign policy agenda of the US, 
and with its hegemonic role in the post-Cold War world. As a result, Russian concerns about the threat to state 
sovereignty posed by this change were closely connected to concerns about the role and intentions of the US. 
Both these sets of concerns have been reflected in Russian governmental articulations of ideas about 
sovereignty, and appear to have reinforced the dual approach to state sovereignty evident in Russian policy and 
practice. 
 
Russia and Sovereignty: Two Approaches 
The idea of state sovereignty has been central to Russian foreign policy since the collapse of the USSR. As 
thinking about, and practice in relation to, the sovereignty norm changed in Western states and key international 
institutions, the Russian focus on sovereignty intensified.  The Russian governmental approach has not been 
uniform, however, with two opposing models of sovereignty evident in Russian foreign policy discourse and 
practice: one is the traditional, or ‘Westphalian’, model of sovereignty which has been applied to Russia itself 
and to states outside the post-Soviet space; inside it, what may be termed a ‘post-Soviet’ approach has 
developed, in which the sovereignty of the states is treated as inviolable in the relation to ‘external’ actors but 
permeable in relation to Russia, on grounds that reproduce the normative justifications of the post-Westphalian 
approach opposed by Russia elsewhere. Although both have been evident since the early 1990s, both have 
strengthened significantly since the turn of the century.  
Russia and Westphalian Sovereignty 
Since the collapse of the USSR, but particularly as the primacy of state sovereignty has come under pressure 
from shifting international norms, Russian governments have viewed state sovereignty as a foundational 
principle in the organisation and conduct of international relations. This position conforms to what might be 
termed a classical or ‘Westphalian’ model of state sovereignty (Krasner 1999), where sovereignty implies 
recognition and acceptance of legal equality by other states, as well as non-interference in states’ internal affairs 
8 
 
and respect for territorial integrity.
9
 For the Russian government, this model of sovereignty constitutes the 
foundation of relations between states and underpins the wider network of international law and international 
institutions which form the legitimate framework for interstate relations. Challenges to the principles of 
territorial integrity and non-interference in domestic affairs are regarded not just as threats to the particular 
states in question but to the entire international political and legal order.  
 
Since the turn of the century, the Russian government has become the most prominent defender of the 
Westphalian model in response to the Western-led shift to a post-Westphalian conception of sovereignty. 
Outside the post-Soviet space, the Russian governmental position on state sovereignty was strengthened in 
response to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which the Russian government condemned as a violation of the principles 
of state sovereignty and international law, asserting that none of the UNSC resolutions on Iraq ‘had authorized 
the violent overthrow of the leadership of a sovereign state’.10 This differed from the Russian governmental 
position on the US-led invasion of Afghanistan; as Allison (2013b) notes, the US’s decision to go to war in 
Afghanistan was not regarded as challenge to the established international legal order because the UNSC 
permanent members, including Russia, accepted the argument that it was a case of self-defence in the face of a 
severe and continuing threat of terrorism; an argument that also enabled the Russian government to link the 
threat in Afghanistan to the threat to Russian state sovereignty in Chechnya. After 2003, concerns about US 
action in Iraq, which had been shared by some NATO members, notably France and Germany, became absorbed 
into Russia’s wider critique of hegemonic disregard for international law and sovereignty, and of the perceived 
                                                          
9
 This article uses an expanded form of Krasner’s ‘Westphalian’ model of sovereignty, incorporating what he 
terms ‘international legal sovereignty’ – in other words, recognition of a state’s sovereign statehood and legal 
equality by other states (see Chapter 1, ‘Sovereignty and Its Discontents’, in Krasner 1999, pp. 3-42). These are 
two aspects of what much of the sovereignty literature has traditionally categorised as external sovereignty and 
together represent the key aspects of sovereignty relations between states in what might be termed classical 
thinking about state sovereignty. 
10
 Security Council concludes two-day debate on military action in Iraq, 27 March 2003, available at: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7707.doc.htm, accessed 25 July 2014. 
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attempt to create a world with only ‘one master, one sovereign’;11  it acted as a key reference point for Russian 
governmental statements about the threat to the state sovereignty principle and to international order posed by 
US-led military action.  
The Kosovo case was even more significant, since it involved the recognition of a secessionist region without 
the consent of the sovereign state. As Antonenko (2007, p.10) noted prior to Kosovo’s recognition, this was 
regarded by the Russian government as setting a dangerous precedent and as a challenge to the international 
legal order. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov observed in 2007 that ‘attempts are being made to solve the 
Kosovo problem at the expense of the international community – that is, by creating a precedent that would go 
beyond the frameworks of international law’ (Lavrov 2007), later describing recognition as involving ‘the 
subversion of all the foundations of international law [and] the subversion of those principles […] laid down in 
the fundamental documents of the UN’.12 Vladimir Putin asserted that ‘to support a unilateral declaration of 
independence by Kosovo is amoral and against the law. Territorial integrity is one of the fundamental principles 
of international law’.13 
Inside the post-Soviet region, the perceived challenge posed by the ‘Colour Revolutions’ increased the Russian 
governmental discursive commitment to the primacy of state sovereignty, an approach shared with authoritarian 
governments in Central Asia (Averre 2007, Ambrosio 2008); in the Russian governmental narrative, the ‘Colour 
Revolutions’ in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004-05) and Kyrgyzstan (2005) were the product of Western 
(principally US) interference in the internal affairs of the states in question, designed to advance US national 
interests and undermine those of Russia under the cover of democracy promotion. Thus although, as discussed 
below, the Westphalian sovereignty model does not, and has never, been understood to apply to the relationship 
                                                          
11
 Vladimir Putin, Munich Security Conference speech, 10 February 2007, available from: 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118123.sht
ml, accessed 31 December 2013. 
12
 RIA Novosti, ‘Lavrov makes emotional plea for sanity over Kosovo independence’, 12 February 2008, 
available at: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080212/99052344.html, accessed 22 November 2012; 
13
 Transcript of Annual Big Press Conference, 14 February 2008, available from: 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/02/14/1011_type82915_160266.shtml, accessed 1 August 
2013. 
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between Russia and the other states of the post-Soviet region, it has always been understood to apply 
unequivocally to the relations between post-Soviet states and other states. 
 
This commitment to state sovereignty as the foundational principle of international relations has been 
established repeatedly in policy documents and public statements, emphasising several aspects of the 
Westphalian model including the fundamental and historic importance of state sovereignty as the central feature 
of a stable international order defined by the primacy of international law; the critical importance of defending 
the state sovereignty principle for Russia’s national security; the threat posed to the principle by the actions of 
the US and its NATO allies (though particular states are rarely mentioned); and Russia’s leading role in 
defending the principle, a position that is understood to reflect global majority opinion.   
 
The 2010 Russian military doctrine places the defence of Russian sovereignty and territorial integrity first in its 
list of the Armed Forces’ peacetime responsibilities, and identifies territorial claims and interference in internal 
affairs, and domestic threats to Russian sovereignty and territorial integrity as, respectively, key external and 
internal threats.
14
 The 2008 and 2013 Russian Foreign Policy Concepts both identify strengthening Russian 
sovereignty and territorial integrity as primary foreign policy objectives, and the 2008 Concept attacked 
‘attempts to depreciate the role of the sovereign state as the fundamental element of international relations’ and 
‘the division of states into categories with different rights and responsibilities’ which creates the dual threat of 
‘undermining the international rule of law, and arbitrary interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states’. 
15
 This was reiterated in the 2013 Concept which, in a direct attack on the application of shifting sovereignty 
principles, states that Russia will ‘oppose the attempts of individual states or groups of states to subject to 
revision universally recognized norms of international law reflected in universal documents’ and condemns as 
‘particularly dangerous to international peace, law and order’ what it characterises as the arbitrary 
reinterpretation of core international legal principles including state sovereignty and territorial integrity to suit 
the interests of individual countries. It asserts that: 
                                                          
14
 Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 5 February 2010. 
15
 Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 15 July 2008. 
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It is unacceptable that, on the pretext of implementation of the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept, 
military interventions and other forms of foreign interference have been carried out, undermining the 
foundation of international law, based on the principle of sovereign equality of states.
16
 
 
This position has been frequently reiterated by members of the Russian government in speeches and other public 
fora, emphasising that shifts in the sovereignty norm are not only illegitimate but destabilising to the 
international order. Addressing the UN General assembly in September 2012, for example, Sergei Lavrov 
argued that ‘world order is threatened by arbitrary interpretation of such essential principles as non-use or threat 
of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and non-
interference in their domestic affairs’.17 Writing shortly before the 2012 Russian presidential election, Vladimir 
Putin asserted that, ‘a string of armed conflicts under the pretext of humanitarian concerns has undermined the 
principle of national sovereignty, which has been observed for centuries. A new type of vacuum, the lack of 
morality and law, is emerging in international affairs’ (Putin 2012). 
 
The Russian view of state sovereignty as fundamental to international order, and its opposition to a shift in the 
sovereignty norm in a US-dominated international political environment, has had significant consequences for 
the management of questions of international peace and security. The most significant, recent example of this 
has been the dispute over the international response to the crisis in Syria. Russian opposition to external 
intervention in the Syrian crisis was widely characterised by non-Russian commentators and media reports as 
the product of a desire to protect a government friendly to Russia and, in particular, to protect Russian interests 
in Syria, above all the Russian naval base at Tartus (Triesman, 2012). As Trenin (2013), and Allison (2013a), 
have noted, however, the Russian government’s opposition to intervention in Syria is profoundly connected to 
concerns about sovereignty and intervention.  
 
This position, reflecting Russian governmental views on the ‘Arab Spring’ more broadly, was incorporated into 
the 2013 Russian Foreign Policy Concept, which asserts that Russia promotes peace in the Middle East ‘on the 
                                                          
16
 Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 12 February 2013. 
17
 Statement at the 67
th
 Session of the UN General Assembly. 
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basis of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity of states and non-interference in their internal affairs’.18 
Russian statements on Syria  consistently made clear that the question of possible intervention in Syria had 
wider consequences for the principle of sovereignty and the shape and stability of international order. Military 
intervention in Syria without the consent of the Syrian government would have compounded the threat to state 
sovereignty generated by the three interventions in Kosovo, Iraq, and Libya, further undermining the legal and 
institutional foundations of international order. Addressing the UNSC in 2012, for example, Lavrov cited 
Putin’s assertion that ‘the primacy of international law must be ensured in the international arena in the same 
way as within states’ and stated that events ‘confirm once again the need to respect the key principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations, above all the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, non-interference in 
their domestic affairs and the non-use or threat of force’.19 This principle of non-interference in other states’ 
internal affairs is one that has been stressed repeatedly in Russian governmental statements on Syria; in 
November 2012, for example, Lavrov claimed that Russian practice was not to work with another state’s 
domestic opposition against the authorities, since ‘this is a principle of inter-state relations and we adhere to 
it’.20 The Russian government maintained the position that US intervention in Syria was not compatible with 
Syrian sovereignty and international law even after the object of that intervention had shifted to addressing the 
threat posed by Islamic State (IS); condemning the September 2014 US bombing of IS positions in Syria 
without either UNSC or Syrian consent, the Russian Foreign Ministry asserted that:   
Russia would like to note that such actions can be carried out only within the framework of 
international law.  This implies not a formal unilateral notification of the strikes, but the existence of 
explicit consent of the Syrian government or a relevant decision by the UN Security Council. […] 
Attempts to pursue geopolitical objectives and violations of the sovereignty of states in the region can 
only aggravate tensions and further serve to destabilise the situation. Moscow has repeatedly warned 
                                                          
18
 Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 12 February 2013. 
19
 UNSC 6841
st
 Meeting, 26 September 2012, p. 7, available at:   
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6841, accessed 29 August 2014. 
20
 Interv’yu Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V. Lavrova informgentstvu “RIA Novosti”, gazete “Moskovskie 
Novosti”, zhurnalu “Rossiya v globalnoi politike”, 8 November 2012, available at: 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/529CA5B554AC387244257AB00020405F, accessed 13 November 
2012. 
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that those who initiate the unilateral use of force bear full international and legal responsibility for its 
consequences.
21
 
As members of the Russian political elite have made clear, responses to the Syrian crisis were a reflection of 
concern about the conduct and outcome of the 2011 intervention in Libya which has been, in turn, seen through 
the prism of Iraq and the wider pressure on state sovereignty. The Libyan intervention was particularly 
significant because it was, as Bellamy notes, ‘the first time that the [UN] Security Council has authorised the 
use of military force for human protection purposes against the wishes of a functioning state’ (Bellamy 2011, 
p.263). The Libyan intervention was thus the first in which the UNSC authorised military action that posed a 
direct challenge to state sovereignty on R2P grounds. Russia’s decision not to veto the resolution appeared to 
indicate a change in attitudes on intervention and a reduced anxiety about threats to the sovereignty principle. 
This proved not to be the case. 
The escalation of military action by NATO states in Libya and the extra-judicial killing of President Muammar 
Gaddafi by Libyan fighters raised, once again, the problem of the relationship between humanitarian 
intervention and the state sovereignty principle. In the period since the intervention, members of the Russian 
government have characterised the action in Libya as intended to effect regime change for the purpose of NATO 
states’ self-interest masquerading as disinterested humanitarian intervention, and as an action recalling the 
invasion of Iraq in its duplicity and disregard for the state sovereignty principle. The linkage between the Iraq, 
Libyan, and Syrian interventions, and the perception that they posed a fundamental challenge to state 
sovereignty, was repeatedly emphasised by key actors including Putin (2012), and then-President Dmitri 
Medvedev who stated that Russia would not support ‘a dead-ringer for Resolution 1973 on Libya, because I am 
firmly convinced that a good resolution was turned into a scrap of paper to cover up a pointless military 
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 Statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the strikes on the Syrian territory, 23 
September 2014, available at: 
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/2dc5b556c23ac4f044257d5c005ce
420!OpenDocument, accessed 15 May 2015. 
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operation […] the Syrian resolution will not be like that’.22 In vetoing a 2011 UNSC resolution on Syria, Vitaly 
Churkin, the Russian Ambassador to the UNSC, asserted that:  
The situation in Syria cannot be considered […] separately from the Libyan experience. The 
international community is alarmed by statements that compliance with Security Council resolutions on 
Libya in the NATO interpretation is a model for the future actions of NATO in implementing the 
responsibility to protect.
23
 
 
As this indicates, the pre-existing Russian governmental commitment to a Westphalian model of sovereignty has 
strengthened both discursively and practically in response to the conceptual and practical pressure on the state 
sovereignty principle in the 21st century. For the Russian government, state sovereignty appears to be the most 
fundamental element of international order and law, the basis for inter-state relations and for the existence of 
international institutions such as the UN. The assertion of this position has been central both to the development 
of Russian foreign policy thinking in general and to diplomatic interactions on key contemporary questions of 
international peace and security, most notably Syria. This is, however, a model of sovereignty which has applied 
only to Russia itself and states outside the post-Soviet space; inside it, an entirely different approach to 
sovereignty – one that runs directly counter to it – has been evident. 
 
 
Russia and post-Soviet Sovereignty 
If Russia has emerged since the turn of the century as the pre-eminent global defender of traditional conceptions 
of state sovereignty, its approach to state sovereignty within the space of the former Soviet Union has been 
radically different. At the same time as the Russian government’s commitment to the primacy of state 
sovereignty strengthened significantly in the face of challenges to the Westphalian model, its position on the 
sovereignty of its neighbours, evident since the collapse of the USSR, also strengthened. The effect of the 
widening difference between the two approaches to sovereignty has been most obvious in the Russian 
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 Financial Times, ‘Interview with President Dmitry Medvedev’, 19 June 2011, available at: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4bfa1f38-9a90-11e0-bab2-00144feab49a.html, accessed 15 June 2012. 
23
 Minutes of the UNSC, S/PV.6627, 4 October 2011, p. 4, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6627, accessed 29 August 2014. 
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intervention in South Ossetia and the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008, and in the absorption 
of Crimea in March 2014.   
 
Like the commitment to a Westphalian model of state sovereignty outside the borders of the post-Soviet space, 
the commitment to a different approach inside it has been a consistent feature of the period since the collapse of 
the USSR. In its dealings with other ex-Soviet states in the 1990s, Russia displayed a view of their sovereignty 
that owed less to the traditional framework of inter-state relations and more to the legacy of the Soviet 
constitutional model. The Soviet constitution nominally recognised the sovereignty of its constituent republics, 
including their right to secede and their sovereign authority on a number of policy areas. In practice, however, 
the Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) had little sovereignty in relation to the federal centre; the constitutional 
order established a simulacrum of republic sovereignty in relation to Moscow in some, limited issue areas but no 
sovereignty on foreign policy in either theory or practice. The re-drawing of SSR boundaries by the federal 
centre, including the movement of sub-units such as Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs) between 
them, indicated that despite the nominal sovereignty of the republics, their territorial limits were determined by 
the federal centre.   
 
In significant ways, this conception of republic sovereignty as nominal but not actual persisted in the relations 
between Moscow and the former republics – now independent states – to produce a post-Soviet model of 
sovereignty (Deyermond, 2008). Also reflecting the difference between the sovereignty of the SSRs and the 
Soviet centre, this approach to the sovereignty of the post-Soviet states has been sharply differentiated in 
character, with Russian state sovereignty treated in discourse and practice as inviolable, and with any 
interventions in the domestic affairs of the other post-Soviet states by states or institutions outside the region 
regarded as threats to the sovereignty of the states concerned, and to Russian security. This has clear echoes of 
the Soviet structure, where the sovereignty of the federal centre and of the constituent republics was, in effect, 
Westphalian in its outward-facing character, but internally limited and contingent, despite assertions to the 
contrary. This claim has persisted in the post-Soviet period and is a particularly striking feature of the Russian 
governmental statements about state sovereignty in the region. As discussed below, interference in neighbouring 
states’ internal affairs has been characterised by the Russian government as evidence of Russian commitment to 
the sovereignty principle – a characterisation that also strongly reflects the language and arguments of the 
liberal, post-Westphalian approach to sovereignty. 
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Throughout the period since the USSR’s collapse, this post-Soviet conception of sovereignty has been evident in 
a wide range of Russian interactions with other states in the region, including the division of Soviet military 
assets (Deyermond 2008), the problem of ‘frozen conflicts’ and Russian peacekeeping in the region (Lynch 
2000), and the supply of gas.  In the last decade, however, this approach has been manifested in more extreme 
ways, notably in Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 and in Russia’s recognition of 
Crimean secession from Ukraine and its incorporation into the Russian Federation in March 2014. Both the 
events in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014 run directly counter to the Westphalian conception of 
sovereignty so central to Russian foreign policy outside the post-Soviet space. The decision to recognise the 
independence from Georgia of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was clearly incompatible with a commitment to the 
primacy of state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. The 
war in Georgia which preceded this recognition, and which saw the incursion of Russian forces over the South 
Ossetian boundary line into the rest of Georgia, was also obviously incompatible with these principles. This was 
even more strikingly the case in 2014, with the Russian government not only recognising the secession of 
Crimea from Ukraine but absorbing it into the territory of the Russian Federation – the first time since the end of 
the Second World War that a European state has annexed the territory of another European state, and the most 
complete rejection possible of the Westphalian sovereignty model. 
 
Despite this, however, the decision to recognise Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence was framed in terms 
of Russian concern for both Georgian sovereignty and that of the regions themselves. In interviews and 
speeches, then-President Medvedev stressed that the Russian military presence in the regions – which lasted 
until 2008 and was viewed by successive Georgian governments as a mechanism for undermining Georgian 
independence from Russian control – was an attempt to preserve Georgian territorial integrity. In an interview 
with CNN he claimed that Russia had spent the entire post-Soviet period attempting to protect Georgian 
territorial integrity;
24
 elsewhere, he claimed that Russia’s involvement in the separatist conflicts had always 
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 Interview with CNN, Sochi, August 26 2008, available at: 
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/a9598af14937e88cc32574b200227
b9b!OpenDocument, accessed 18 April 2014. 
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‘proceeded from the recognition of Georgia’s territorial integrity’.25 At the same time, the Russian government 
argued that Georgian independence had itself violated the Abkhaz and South Ossetian republics’ rights to 
determine whether or not to secede from the USSR – in other words, Georgian independence had violated 
Abkhaz and South Ossetian sovereignty.
26
 Medvedev’s address on 26 August 2008 characterised the actions of 
the Georgian government as an attempted annexation of South Ossetia; the Russian military action, in this 
account was an attempt to prevent the annexation of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
27
 
 
While attempting to present Russian military action in Georgia and the recognition of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia as compatible with the state sovereignty principle (in the case of the republics, with the principle of the 
sovereignty of the constituent units of a federal state), these actions were also represented in terms which 
directly reflected the Western-led shift in the sovereignty norm. Thus, Russian action in August 2008 was 
presented as a humanitarian intervention, and as a means to facilitate the self-determination of the regions’ 
populations. In Russian governmental accounts, reiterated many times in late August 2008, Russian military 
intervention was required to avert Georgian-instigated genocide in South Ossetia – a term which implied a 
moral and legal obligation to intervene. Georgian aggression, in this account, compelled the regions to secede to 
ensure their national self-determination and security.
28
 Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was held to 
conform to international law because it was a response to a formal request for recognition made by the regions’ 
parliaments, following referendums that were, in turn, a response to the threats to security and self-
determination posed by Georgian aggression.
29
 Thus, the recognition of their independence was, in the Russian 
governmental narrative, grounded in both democratic practice in the regions themselves and therefore in 
international law because:  
A right to self-determination […] is provided for in the provisions of the UN Charter, the relevant 
international conventions and the Helsinki Final Act. And if another state believes that a people has 
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 Zayavlenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii D. A. Medvedeva, 26 August 2008, available at: 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/5A25D3A9082FB6E7C32574B1003DAF8D, accessed 18 April 2014. 
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 Zayavlenie MID Rossii, 26 August 2008 available at:  
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/6E758FAF78A475AFC32574B100545BD9, accessed 18 April 2014. 
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 Zayavlenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii D. A. Medvedeva, 26 August 2008. 
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 Zayavlenie MID Rossii, 26 August 2008. 
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 Zayavlenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii D. A. Medvedeva, 26 August 2008. 
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expressed its will to have an independent existence and conducts a referendum, which actually was the 
case in both of these two republics, any other state in the world has the right to recognize this 
independence.
30
  
 
In the Russian government’s most widely reported discursive appropriation of the intervention practices about 
which it was so sceptical elsewhere, Lavrov claimed that Russian military action in Georgia was necessary 
because Russia had a ‘responsibility to protect’ Russian citizens living in South Ossetia.31 The claim was 
criticised as an incorrect and distorted invocation of the ‘R2P’ principle (Evans 2009, Bellamy 2010); 
significantly, however, this responsibility was claimed to derive not from the UN’s ‘R2P’(which Lavrov 
mentioned as another instance of the principle, additional to the one being invoked by Russia) but from the 
Russian constitutional obligation to protect Russian citizens abroad.  
This approach has been repeated in relation to the March 2014 absorption of Crimea into the Russian 
Federation. Again, the legitimacy of the decision to recognise Crimea’s secession was held to derive from the 
right to self-determination; the democratic and legal process by which the secession occurred; and its basis in 
international law. Putin and Lavrov both stressed this argument, asserting that the UN Charter and other 
documents ensured the right of the Crimean population to self-determination. This was held to derive not just 
from the explicit provisions of these documents but from what Lavrov asserted to be an underlying assumption 
embedded in them that the territorial integrity of states is contingent on the fact that that they permit the self-
determination of the populations inside their borders. What Lavrov identified as the failure of the provisional 
Ukrainian government on this issue thus undermined Ukraine’s entitlement to territorial integrity.32     
As in the cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in relation to Georgia, the Russian governmental narrative on 
Crimea has invoked the illegality of a prior decision as a basis for considering the region not legitimately part of 
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 Interview with CNN, Sochi, August 26 2008. 
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 Interview by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergei Lavrov to BBC, August 9 2008, 
available at:  http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/C4367C2B715EDA6DC32574A2005548AC, accessed 17 
May 2013. 
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an independent Ukraine. In his March 2014 address, Putin asserted that the 1954 decision to transfer Crimea and 
Sevastopol to Ukraine violated the USSR’s constitutional norms and was done without the consent of the 
Crimean population.
33
 The absorption of Crimea by Russia thus represented the correction of an illegal and 
undemocratic decision in respect of Crimea. Further justification, in this account, derived from the illegality of 
the temporary Ukrainian government which was unconstitutional, installed by means of a violent coup, and 
posed a threat to the security of the Crimean population.  At the same time, however, a continued commitment 
to Ukrainian state sovereignty was emphasised; in his address on the absorption of Crimea, Putin asserted that 
‘we want Ukraine to be a strong, sovereign […] state’ and that in contrast to those (presumably both the 
provisional Ukrainian government and Western supporters) who sacrificed Ukrainian unity for political gain, 
‘we have always respected [Ukrainian] territorial integrity’.34  
While the approach to Crimea was justified by reference to international law and to the sovereignty claims of 
the region, as in the Georgian case, the language and arguments of humanitarian intervention were also 
deployed. Thus, Putin’s speech on the incorporation of Crimea into Russia alleged actual and threatened human 
rights abuses against the Russian population of Crimea, including ‘forced assimilation’ in the post-Soviet 
period, and post-Yanukovich threats to minority rights.
35
 At the same time, the threat to Ukrainian state 
sovereignty was asserted to be from Western sources, not Russian ones, with a Foreign Ministry spokesman 
claiming that the threatened sanctions against the former Yanukovich government constituted ‘economic 
pressure on a sovereign state’ and citing other ‘examples of the active connivance of the United States and the 
EU in the coup d’état in Kiev, acting against the political independence and sovereignty of Ukraine’.36 
As the cases of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 demonstrate, and in direct opposition to the Russian 
position on sovereignty outside the space of the former Soviet Union, the approach to sovereignty inside it 
dispenses with the Westphalian model in favour of what could be termed a post-Soviet model. This approach 
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places a high value on the idea of sovereignty, but does not assume that in the case of neighbouring states it 
implies sovereignty in relation to Russia. Indeed, Russian concern for the sovereignty of neighbouring states is 
demonstrated by their intervention in the domestic political affairs of those states. It also places a shifting value 
on the sovereignty of neighbouring states relative to the sovereignty claims of their constituent regions, the 
merits of which can be determined by the Russian government. All this occurs, however, as part of a 
commitment to the primacy of international law and to the principles of state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. This appears ‘post-Soviet’ not just in the sense that it applies to the other successor states of the USSR 
but because it appears to reflect aspects of the Soviet constitutional relationship between Moscow and the 
republics. At the same time, contemporary Russian governmental discourse on sovereignty in the region clearly 
draws on the language and principles of R2P regarding intervention and sovereignty. 
 
The Functions of Sovereignty  
These two approaches, radically opposed in their characterisation of the meaning and limits of state sovereignty, 
and reflecting a view of sovereign statehood in the non-Russian, post-Soviet space as entirely different from that 
elsewhere, appear fundamentally inconsistent with one another – the product of a reactive, incoherent foreign 
policy. This view, however, obscures the overwhelmingly instrumental function that sovereignty discourse plays 
in contemporary Russian foreign policy. Thus, ideas about sovereignty are not a starting point or basis for 
Russian foreign policy, they are a means of articulating and advancing it, particularly in relation to the post-
Soviet region and to the US and its allies. Reflecting anxieties about the shifting sovereignty norm as a product 
of assertive, hegemonic behaviour by the US, the dual approach to sovereignty is also a mechanism for 
responding to it and for securing and enhancing Russia’s position in international relations; seen in this light, the 
differentiated position on sovereignty appears to be a more coherent and effective aspect of Russian foreign 
policy. Both individually and together, the two approaches perform three particularly important functions for the 
Russian government: protecting core Russian national interests; acting as a mechanism for both hard and soft 
balancing against the US and its allies; and acting as a marker of Russia’s ‘rising power’ identity. 
 
Sovereignty and Russian National Interests 
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The first function of the Russian government’s dual approach to sovereignty is the protection of what it appears 
to view as core Russian national interests.
37
 The liberal shift in the sovereignty norm has been understood as 
profoundly problematic because it appears to threaten both Russia’s domestic security and its international 
status. This shift affects three issues in particular, all perceived to be critically important to Russia. 
Firstly, contemporary challenges to the primacy of state sovereignty have appeared to threaten Russian 
territorial integrity. Although Chechnya no longer presents the prospect of imminent territorial loss, the long 
secessionist conflict and the continued instability in the North Caucasus more widely are powerful reminders of 
the threat to this aspect of Russian state sovereignty. More generally, anxieties about territorial integrity have 
been a long-standing feature of Russian governmental thought and extend beyond the specific threats of the 
North Caucasus to other regions, including the underpopulated Russian Far East (Graham 2010). These 
concerns are evident in statements and documents, including the most important public statements of Russia’s 
security and foreign policies. Thus, the 2010 Russian Military Doctrine identified as one of the main internal 
threats to the Russian state the ‘undermining of state sovereignty and violation of the unity and territorial 
integrity of the Russian Federation’;38 the first foreign policy priority identified by the 2013 foreign policy 
concept is the ‘preservation and strengthening of [Russia’s] sovereignty and territorial integrity’.39 Thus, the 
commitment to a Westphalian model of state sovereignty must be understood, in part, as a reflection of anxieties 
about Russian territorial integrity. 
A second reason that contemporary shifts in the sovereignty principle appear threatening concerns Russia’s 
domestic political character. Russia’s turn towards a more authoritarian model of government; restrictions on 
aspects of civil society including the 2006 law restricting the activities of non-governmental organisations and 
the forceful response to election protests in 2011 and after; high profile incidents including the Pussy Riot and 
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Magnitsky cases; and the historic record of human rights violations, not least in Chechnya, created a perceived 
vulnerability to challenges to its state sovereignty. The link, established most obviously in the case of Kosovo 
(but reinforced by the wider rhetoric of US, and other Western states’ political elites) between democracy 
promotion, the desire to protect minorities and other groups from human rights abuses committed by their 
government, and hegemon-led breaches of the state sovereignty principle has appeared to be understood as a 
threat. As one analysis suggested, the Russian position on sovereignty ‘is informed by a concern that if these 
principles were further eroded, Russia or its close allies in the former Soviet space could themselves be subject 
to external intervention’;40 Charap suggests that this has been the principal reason for opposing intervention in 
Syria (Charap 2013, p.37). As Allison argues, the Russian government’s position on the primacy of state 
sovereignty thus ‘remains to a large extent an external expression of [Putin’s] preoccupations with Russian 
domestic order’ (Allison 2013b, p.818); indeed, Allison suggests that this preoccupation has shaped Russian 
post-Cold War responses to changes to the practice of intervention and the broader changes to global norms 
(Allison 2013a). Members of the Russian political elite have repeatedly argued that double standards and the 
promotion of US national interests have characterised Western applications of the principle that state 
sovereignty is contingent on respect for human rights. In the Russian governmental narrative, the risk to Russia 
thus stems not from any domestic flaws (the Russian government has frequently sought to repudiate the 
portrayal of Russia as undemocratic and a human rights violator) but from the manipulation of the arguments 
about the sovereignty principle and intervention in order to advance US interests in weakening Russia. Both this 
issue and the concerns about territorial integrity indicate that for the Russian government, the preservation of the 
Westphalian model of state sovereignty in relation to Russia is an existential question; for this reason, as 
Krastev suggests, sovereignty has ‘absolute primacy’ in Russian foreign policy (Krastev 2009, p.77).    
Some similar factors appear to be at stake in Russia’s dual approach to the sovereignty principle in relation to 
other states. Outside the post-Soviet space, the strength of the Russian government’s commitment to the 
Westphalian model of sovereignty appears to be linked, in part, to the nature of its relationships with states 
whose domestic conduct has made them vulnerable to intervention. The strongest expressions of Russia’s 
commitment to the Westphalian model of sovereignty have been made in relation to states with longstanding 
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Studies, September 2012, available from: http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-
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political, cultural or security links to Russia; concerns about threats to the sovereignty of states with weaker 
relations with Russia have been notably more muted. Thus, Russian opposition to the undermining of Serbian 
sovereignty through recognition of Kosovo was greater than its opposition to the invasion of Iraq. Russia’s 
relationship with Syria has been frequently identified as a factor in the Russian defence of Syrian sovereignty 
(Dannreuther 2011, Allison 2013a), which contrasted with its position on intervention in Libya (although, as 
noted above, the position on Syria was also evidently a reaction to events in Libya). 
Inside the region of the former Soviet Union, the differentiated, post-Soviet approach to sovereignty appears 
designed to protect Russian national interests in these states. A view of ‘outward-facing’ state sovereignty (in 
other words, the sovereignty of other post-Soviet states in relation to states outside the post-Soviet space) as 
inviolable has been evident in Russian governmental attacks on US and EU intervention. Bilateral and 
multilateral relationships with the other post-Soviet states have always been critical to Russian national security 
and foreign policy strategies, and ‘external’ threats to the sovereignty of these states appear to threaten Russian 
regional influence and therefore (for the Russian government) its security. Both a reduction in Russian influence 
and a corresponding US or EU growth in influence appear to threaten Russian national interests in a number of 
ways, particularly by bringing Western states closer to Russia’s borders and by undercutting one of the key 
pillars of Russian claims to ‘great power’ status – its position as a regional power. Thus, as widely noted, US 
support for the ‘Colour Revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan was attacked by the Russian 
government as illegitimate interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, by a hegemonic state using 
claims regarding democracy as a cover for the advancement of its interests.
41
 Russian comment on US and EU 
activity in Ukraine in 2014 has followed a similar pattern, as noted above, with claims that economic sanctions 
against the Yanukovich government represented an attack on Ukrainian state sovereignty and that its collapse 
was orchestrated by the US and its European allies.  At the same time, the sovereignty of these states in relation 
to Russia has been treated as limited and contingent, again for reasons of national interest. Georgia, for example, 
has always been regarded as an area of Russian geopolitical interest; similarly, Ukraine has been viewed 
throughout the post-Soviet period as central to Russian national interests in many areas. The assertion of 
Russian military, economic, and political power in a way that undermines its neighbours’ political independence 
and territorial integrity is a means of both securing its own interests and excluding (or attempting to exclude) 
‘external’ states. 
                                                          
41
 See, for example, Wilson 2009. 
24 
 
Finally, a dual approach to sovereignty acts as a mechanism for the protection of Russia’s international status, 
specifically its status as a great power. As Andrew Hurrell (2006) has argued, Russia, as a second-tier state, 
places great emphasis on the role of international institutions and on its position within them. For Russia, 
lacking the economic power of states such as the US or China, permanent UNSC membership, in particular, is 
central to its continued great power status.  As a result of the military actions in Serbia and Iraq, the shift to a 
post-Westphalian model of sovereignty has been associated with the weakening of the authority of the UN. 
More broadly, a challenge to the state sovereignty principle poses a challenge to the validity of the UNSC and 
other international organisations whose membership is constituted on the basis of sovereign statehood. Thus, the 
challenge to the primacy of state sovereignty posed by both the reconceptualisation of sovereignty and actions 
that reflect this shift appear to undermine the authority of – indeed, the organisational principles of – the 
international structures that helps to constitute Russia as a great power. 
If a commitment to a Westphalian model of sovereignty outside the region of the former Soviet Union helps to 
strengthen one pillar of Russian great power identity, a post-Soviet approach to sovereignty inside it appears 
intended to strengthen another: its position as a regional power. In addition to permanent UNSC membership 
(and its continued status as a nuclear superpower), Russia’s international standing is closely connected to its role 
as the leading state in the large region of the former Soviet Union. An approach that treats the sovereignty of 
neighbouring states as inviolable in relation to extra-regional states but porous in relation to Russia obviously 
works to strengthen Russian dominance in the region, although the extent to which this has been a successful 
strategy appears increasingly questionable, as Russian dominance through various forms of coercion – most 
obviously in Ukraine – has acted to undermine Russian international standing among other powerful states and 
alarm its European neighbours.  
 
Sovereignty Models as Balancing Device 
The dual position on state sovereignty and the resistance to the rethinking of sovereignty and intervention norms 
which emerged at the turn of the millennium thus appear to be closely connected to immediate questions of 
Russian national interests. There are, however, additional explanations for the Russian governmental approach 
to sovereignty which concern broader questions of power distribution and identity in international politics. For 
Russia’s political elites, the question of sovereignty – its meaning and application – appear to be an important 
conceptual and practical mechanism for the exercise of resistance to US global leadership and for the 
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development of alternative centres of political authority in the contemporary  international system. One of the 
principle functions of the Russian position on sovereignty thus appears to be a means of balancing against the 
US. 
The theoretical literature on balancing identifies two forms: hard balancing (what has traditionally been 
understood by the term ‘balancing’, which implies the use of military instruments) and soft balancing. Soft 
balancing is a concept referring to the use of diplomatic and other non-military measures to balance against a 
hegemonic state without risking a direct challenge through the use of military force (Pape 2005). It was 
developed to explain then-current and likely future responses to assertive, unilateralist US foreign policy, and 
was particularly linked by one of its early formulators to the formation of short-term, diplomatic coalitions in 
the UN (Paul 2005). In the discourse and practice relating to Russian sovereignty models, both forms of 
balancing are observable: soft balancing in the Westphalian approach to sovereignty outside its region; a harder 
form of balancing in the post-Soviet approach inside it.  
In their assessment of other states’ responses to a US-led, unipolar system, Stephen Brooks and William 
Wohlforth (2008) asserted that soft balancing, and the existence of balance-of threat tendencies, did not exist in 
the contemporary international system. This, they concluded, was because other states are only willing to risk 
the costs of balancing against the unipolar power when their core national interests are at stake, and that balance 
of threat rests significantly on the perceptions of other states in respect of the unipole. This may not have been a 
factor in other states’ responses to the US, they suggest, because it is ‘possible that great powers’ perceptions of 
US intentions have not, in fact, changed at all’ (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008, p.66). Their more recent work 
concedes that soft balancing has occurred but the extent to which it has done so is unclear because it is ‘difficult 
to distinguish from standard diplomatic bargaining and competition’ (Brooks et al. 2012-13, p.22). Many 
analysts take a less sceptical view, arguing that evidence of soft balancing has indeed begun to emerge, 
particularly on the part of Russia and China (Ferguson 2012, Posen 2013). 
This assessment – that states had not been engaging in hard balancing or significant levels of soft balancing 
against the US because their core interests were not at stake, and because perceptions of US intentions may not 
have changed – appears particularly problematic in relation to Russia, and particularly on questions of state 
sovereignty. A number of more recent analyses of US hegemony have recognised the importance of ideational 
and normative factors in the exercise of, and challenges to, hegemony (Kupchan 2011, Ferguson 2012). This is 
particularly the case when the hegemonic state is strongly associated with global norm setting and promotion, 
26 
 
and where those norms are explicitly linked to the hegemon’s domestic political values. The role of the US as a 
global promoter of a particular set of liberal political values, and the tendency of its government, particularly 
during the George W. Bush presidency, to link the promotion of those values with a sometimes assertive, 
interventionist foreign policy, means that those states concerned by US dominance are likely to identify norms 
as area of resistance to US hegemony and a mechanism for soft balancing. This is made even more likely when 
a hegemon-led shift in norms (or one that is perceived to be hegemon-led) is thought to threaten both national 
interests and the core conceptual ground on which a state’s foreign policy rests. 
Russian disagreements with the US have frequently taken the form of disputes over international norms or 
domestic political values (and the distinction between them). US objection to Russian authoritarianism and anti-
democratic practices is discursively reciprocated by Russia on issues as diverse as decision-making in 
international institutions (where US conduct is held to threaten attempts to create democratic international 
relations), and adoptions of Russian children by US citizens (suspended on grounds of human rights violations). 
The dispute over sovereignty fits clearly into this pattern. It is however, more substantive than these frequently 
rhetorical gestures.  Resistance to shifts in the sovereignty norm represents not only a ground of difference 
between Russia and the West, it presents a challenge to US foreign policy ambitions in key areas. It also clearly 
seeks to protect Russian state sovereignty, power, and authority, in the face of the hegemon’s preferences. It 
thus acts as a form of soft balancing. 
 
In recent years, Russian diplomatic practice and foreign policy discourse in relation to sovereignty have together 
acted as a mechanism for soft balancing against the US in particular and secondarily against the US’s European 
allies. Strong criticism of the US’s destabilisation of the state sovereignty principle has been a central feature of 
Russian governmental discourse in the last decade. As noted above, assertions regarding the threat posed by 
other states – explicitly or implicitly, the US and its NATO allies – to state sovereignty and thus to international 
security and order are prominent in both the foreign policy concepts released in the last decade, and in numerous 
speeches and other public statements by key figures including Putin, Medvedev, and Lavrov. These documents 
and statements emphasise the illegitimacy of the US’s approach towards sovereignty, stressing the inconsistency 
of application; the destabilising effect on international order resulting from the undermining of this core 
principle of international law and institutions; and the hypocritical use of this new approach to sovereignty in 
order to advance US national interests under the cover of humanitarian intervention and support for national 
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self-determination. The discursive pushback on sovereignty clearly appears intended to challenge the credibility 
of the US’s position in international diplomatic forums. 
This discursive challenge has not, of course, been confined to the rhetoric of Russian foreign policy documents 
and statements. Most significantly, it has also been used to challenge the US and block the approval for their 
preferred course of action in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) where those actions appear to 
threaten the Westphalian sovereignty principle. As noted above, both during and after the US-led invasion and 
occupation of Iraq, Russian opposition focused on the illegitimacy of the action as a breach of state sovereignty. 
More recently, intervention in Syria was blocked on the same grounds – that an intervention in Syria without the 
consent of the Syrian government would be illegitimate because it would disregard state sovereignty principles. 
In both cases, opposition to intervention by the US and its allies on sovereignty protection grounds has been 
linked by Russian governmental statements to opposition to US hegemony and the destructive effects of US 
foreign policy – to the idea that, as Lavrov remarked in the context of Syria, ‘we should not allow irresponsible 
actions dictated by expedient interests to shatter the system of international law’.42 This use of the sovereignty 
principle to block the advancement of US foreign policy objectives in diplomatic forums exactly meets the 
definition of soft balancing. 
If support for the Westphalian model of sovereignty in international affairs is a means of soft balancing against 
the US, Russia’s actions in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, reflecting a post-Soviet approach to 
sovereignty, are examples of a newer, and harder, approach to balancing. While disregard for the territorial 
integrity of both states and the interference in their internal affairs had the most direct and traumatic 
consequences for the states themselves, the target of Russian action should also be understood to be external 
actors. Russian action appeared to be triggered by, and a mechanism for resisting, changes to the external 
orientation of Georgia and Ukraine and their inclusion in Western institutions. Russian recognition of 
Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence from Georgia and its August 2008 military intervention in Georgia 
are widely understood to have been, in significant part, a response to the proposed extension of NATO 
membership to Georgia earlier in the year.
43
 Although not supported by some European NATO members, the 
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 Session of the UN General Assembly, 28 September 2012. 
43
 Some analysts, for example Cornell, Popjanevski, and Nilsson (2008, p. 27) argue that the trigger for Russian 
military intervention in Georgia was the failure to agree a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Georgia at the 
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inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine in NATO was strongly promoted by the US government, which took the 
position that ‘NATO must make clear that it welcomes the aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine for membership 
in NATO and offers them a clear path forward toward that goal’.44 Regarding the further expansion of NATO to 
include two post-Soviet states as an attempt to widen the US sphere of interest at the expense of Russia, the 
Russian government responded with actions that formalised the longstanding de facto lack of Georgian 
territorial integrity in relation to Russian military incursions into Georgian territory and their recognition of 
Georgia’s secessionist regions. In addition to extending Russian influence in the regions, the evidence of 
Russia’s willingness to engage in military action in Georgia; the increased, longer-term presence of Russian 
troops in Georgian territory (in South Ossetia and Abkhazia); and the end of any prospect for Georgian 
territorial integrity all combined to render impossible Georgia’s accession to NATO. The assertion of Russian 
authority over matters of internal Georgian sovereignty such as the assumption of responsibility in relation to 
specific population groups; de facto military control over territory; and the recognition of secessionist regions 
acted as a form of hard balancing – using military force and recognition of secessionist regions in a third party 
in order to halt the expansion of a US-led security institution into a region the Russian government regarded as 
part of its sphere of influence.   
The use of a post-Soviet approach to sovereignty as a means of hard balancing against the West also appeared to 
be at work in the case of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014. The collapse of the Yanukovich government was 
a consequence of Ukrainian withdrawal from the proposed Association Agreement with the EU; the agreement 
itself, the public protests against Ukraine’s withdrawal from negotiations, and the government’s collapse were 
all linked to an alleged US and EU desire to extend influence as a means both of advancing national interests 
and containing Russia. Evidence of this view was widespread, including claims by Lavrov that the protests were 
promoted by the US and EU and that the EU’s Eastern Partnership programme was created by the US’s most 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
NATO summit in April 2008. This, they suggest, encouraged Russia to act to prevent the possibility of a MAP 
renewal. 
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 Fact Sheet: the 2008 NATO Summit, available at: http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/04/20080402-1.html, accessed 26 May 2014. 
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loyal European allies to block the possibility of EU-Russian cooperation, which would threaten US primacy.
45
  
Russian military activity in Eastern Ukraine and the absorption of Crimea may therefore be understood, in part, 
as a means of blocking the expansion of Western influence in Ukraine and the post-Soviet region more broadly, 
including (as in Georgia) rendering future NATO accession impossible through a permanent breach of 
Ukrainian territorial integrity. Russian control over Crimea, and its possession of the Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet 
bases also significantly increased Russian naval strength in the Black Sea region and rendered a large proportion 
of the Ukrainian coastline potentially vulnerable to Russia; this has inhibited the ability of Ukraine to join 
NATO in the future, and is likely to act as a check on other forms of Western security engagement in Ukraine 
and elsewhere in the region. Russian governmental action in Ukraine, above all the absorption of Crimea, 
represents the hardest form of balancing against the US and its allies that it has utilised since the collapse of the 
USSR.  
 
 
Sovereignty as emerging power identity marker  
The use of sovereignty as a balancing tool against the US and its allies has not occurred in isolation. Closely 
linked to it, and reinforcing it, has been a perception that the Westphalian sovereignty model is a point of 
normative commonality with other non-Western states, particularly ‘emerging powers’, and above all China. A 
commitment to the primacy of state sovereignty in international relations, then, also appears to function for 
Russia as an identity marker for non-Western powers in an emergent multipolar order, and as point of normative 
and political cohesion within otherwise diverse groups of states. This consensus on the Westphalian model of 
sovereignty, however, means that the alternative Russian approach to sovereignty inside the post-Soviet space is 
a potentially significant problem for any attempt to consolidate an emerging power corporate identity that 
includes Russia. This is particularly problematic since, as noted above, the Russian governmental approach to 
the sovereignty of its neighbours connects in fundamental ways to Russia’s status as a regional power, on which 
its international status partly rests. Thus, this third function of the dual Russian approach to sovereignty appears 
increasingly undermined by the contradictions between the two models. 
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Anxiety about the shift in the sovereignty norm has not been exclusive to Russia. A number of other states – for 
reasons including domestic concerns about secession, global stability, and interventions designed to effect 
regime change in non-democratic states unallied to the US – have expressed opposition to the emergence of a 
post-Westphalian approach to sovereignty. Prominent supporters of the traditional sovereignty model include 
many of the ‘emerging powers’; their position is reflected not only in individual statements, but in shared 
diplomatic positions on certain issues and in documents associated with institutions connected to them, notably 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), of which Russia and China are the most prominent members, 
and the grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS).  
The SCO, comprising four of the former Soviet states of Central Asia, Russia, and China, is an organisation 
characterised by a number of key, shared political values, of which respect for state sovereignty is perhaps the 
most important. Concerns about threats to territorial integrity deriving from separatism – one of the SCO’s so-
called ‘three evils’– have been central to the organisation’s focus on sovereignty. Since the middle of the last 
decade, another significant factor has been the Western-led shift in the sovereignty norm. In the SCO, all the 
members of which are states regarded by the US as not democratic, the impact of this shift in sovereignty 
discourse and practice was clearly magnified by the ‘Colour Revolutions’, alleged to be a product of 
interference by the US and its allies in states’ domestic affairs. This was perhaps a particular concern for the 
region given the US’s support for the 2005 ‘Tulip Revolution’ in SCO member Kyrgyzstan, for which, together 
with the Rose and Orange Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, the George W. Bush administration sometimes 
appeared to take credit.
46
  
As a number of analysts have noted (for example, Ambrosio 2008, Aris and Snetkov 2013) a key consequence 
of this anxiety about externally promoted threats to regime stability has been a strong commitment to the 
Westphalian sovereignty model and an assertion of the principle that, ‘historically formed differences […] in 
political and social systems […] should not be utilized as pretexts to interfere in other states' internal affairs. 
Specific models of social development should not be subject to export’.47 Not surprisingly, as a result, a 
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commitment to state sovereignty, the primacy of international law, and non-intervention in states’ internal 
affairs have become prominent features of SCO statements, confirming members’ ‘mutual support for state 
sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity’.48 The SCO has regularly confirmed this position in relation 
to events outside its area as well as within it, notably in response to the ‘Arab Spring’ and the crises in Libya 
and Syria; the 2011 Astana Declaration, for example, asserted that the international response to unrest in the 
Middle East must observe international law, respect independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
‘observing the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of all states’.49 A commitment to the traditional 
conception of state sovereignty is thus one of the principal factors uniting these states; as a point of resistance to 
potential threats from democratisation and human rights-related intervention, it appears to be an aspect of 
member states’ corporate identity that has developed in opposition to a Western ‘other’ (Aris and Snetkov 
2013).
50
   
A shared position on state sovereignty has also emerged as one of the few areas of common political ground 
between the BRICS states, evident in both the rhetoric and diplomatic practice of the group, with summit 
declarations repeatedly stressing members’ shared commitment to a model of international relations that 
respects state sovereignty and territorial integrity.   In addition to general statements of principle, this 
commitment has been emphasised in relation to particular cases, notably Libya where, as Thakur notes, all 
members attacked the broadening of the UN-authorised intervention for failing to respect Libyan state 
sovereignty (Thakur 2013, p.70). Even on Syria, where there has not been a unified position among BRICS 
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 Aris and Snetkov suggest, however, that while some aspects of SCO discourse and identity have developed in 
opposition to the West, the broader ‘geopolitical identity’ of the SCO is more complex than a simplistic reading 
of the organisation as purely anti-Western defensive structure would suggest. 
32 
 
states on UNSC resolutions, joint statements have stressed the need to ‘respect Syrian independence, territorial 
integrity and sovereignty’.51  
As analysts have noted – and unlike the SCO member states, all of which have governments involving at least 
some elements of authoritarianism – the BRICS states are a heterogeneous grouping that includes both 
authoritarian and democratic regime types, populations of different size, and varied economies. Despite their 
differences, the member states share a common position as regional powers, each of them, as Cooper and 
Flemes suggest, a significant global diplomatic actor that is ‘either too big or too uncomfortable with its 
immediate neighbourhood’ (Cooper and Flemes 2013, p. 952). As powerful regional actors with (varying) 
global political importance, they have often been identified as key states in a developing multipolar order, 
possessing, to different degrees, the features of emerging powers identified by Macfarlane: ‘regional 
preponderance, aspiration to a global role, and the contesting of US hegemony’ (Macfarlane 2006, p. 41); this, 
in particular, is what links Russia to the other members which – unlike Russia – have often been characterised as 
rising economic powers. It is this aspect of the BRICS states, at least as much as the shared anxieties of some 
members (Russia, China, and India most obviously) about threats to their territorial integrity, that has been 
identified as a cause of the shared position on sovereignty. For Pant, for example, the BRICS’s commitment to 
the state sovereignty principle is a product of their desire for ‘a multipolar world order where US unipolarity 
remains constrained by other poles in the system’ (Pant 2013, p.94); in Laïdi’s analysis, the BRICS grouping, 
emerging as a response to the attack on state sovereignty manifested in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, ‘form a 
coalition of sovereign state defenders’ who seek to ‘erode Western hegemonic claims by protecting the principle 
which these claims are deemed to most threaten, namely the political sovereignty of states’ (Laïdi, 2012, p.615). 
Thus, a commitment to the Westphalian sovereignty model is the most important feature and identifying mark of 
BRICS membership. 
The fact that the group is evidence of an emerging multipolar, post-hegemonic world and the unifying function 
of a commitment to the state sovereignty norm both appear central to Russian governmental engagement with 
BRICS. Russia has been critical to the development of the BRICS grouping, convening its first summit meeting 
and, as Ferdinand suggests, acting as its ‘most enthusiastic advocate of foreign policy coordination’ (Ferdinand 
2014, p. 377). The 2013 official Russian concept on participation in BRICS credits Russia with initiating the 
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group, asserting that its creation was one of the most important geopolitical events of the 21
st
 century, reflecting 
the ‘formation of a polycentric system of international relations’; the concept also notes that one of its principal 
features is a shared commitment to the primacy of international law and state sovereignty.
52
 Interviewed in 
March 2013, Putin stated that the grouping was, ‘a key element of the emerging multipolar world. […] Our 
countries do not accept power politics or violation of other countries' sovereignty. We share approaches to the 
pressing international issues, including the Syrian crisis, the situation around Iran, and Middle East 
settlement’.53 
 A commitment to the Westphalian sovereignty model thus serves, additionally, as a marker of BRICS identity 
and, in the Russian characterisation, as a feature that distinguishes the emergent powers of a new, multipolar 
order, with their commitment to a lawful and stable international political system, from the declining US with its 
destabilising and revisionist approach to international relations. This marker of ‘BRICS-ness’ is particularly 
significant for Russia which struggles in other ways to fit the ‘emerging power’ model which characterises other 
members of the group. For the Russian government, sovereignty and the BRICS appear to reinforce the 
significance of one another – the BRICS are significant, in part, because they help to shore up the Westphalian 
sovereignty model, but at the same time the model has importance as a marker of BRICS identity, and thus of 
membership of the club of emerging powers in a post-hegemonic world. 
 
The strong commitment of SCO and BRICS members to a Westphalian sovereignty model, and the extent to 
which that commitment is a defining feature of these organisations, means that Russia’s other approach to 
sovereignty is problematic for its relations with partner states in these organisations. Although a post-Soviet 
approach has been consistently evident in Russia’s engagement with its neighbours since the collapse of the 
USSR, the recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence represented a greater challenge to the 
Westphalian model than lower profile actions such as disputes over the occupation of military bases. The 2014 
absorption of Crimea into the Russian Federation and Russian involvement in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine 
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both confirms and escalates the earlier challenge to the primacy of state sovereignty principle as traditionally 
understood.  
In the short term, the impact of this conflict between Russia’s two approaches to sovereignty appears to have 
been limited. None of the other BRICS and SCO members supported the March 2014 UN General Assembly 
resolution calling on states not to recognise Russia’s absorption of Crimea and there has been no other explicit 
public criticism of Russian governmental action in Ukraine by any of these states. However, the wording of 
some statements about Crimea have clearly implied criticism of Russia, even though this is balanced by 
criticism of other actors. Speaking during the March 2014 UNSC discussion of Ukraine, which took place 
immediately before the Crimean referendum on secession, the Chinese ambassador, who abstained on the 
resolution condemning Russian action in Ukraine, stated that, ‘China always respects the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of all states […] we note that foreign interference is also a significant factor, giving rise to 
violent clashes on the streets of Ukraine and resulting in the crisis in the country’.54 Later in March, after the 
incorporation of Crimea into Russia, the Chinese statement on the General Assembly resolution was more 
critical, asserting that, ‘China has always been opposed to intervention in the internal affairs of other countries 
and has always respected the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries’; in a similarly 
indirect but clear criticism, the Brazilian statement noted that ‘Brazil has consistently upheld that the Charter of 
the United Nations must be respected under all circumstances. That position reflects our unflinching defence of 
an international system based on cooperative multilateralism and respect for international law. 
55
 As this implies, 
Russian actions – most obviously Russian military engagement in Eastern Ukraine and the political and 
organisational consolidation of Crimea’s annexation56 – have made a continued commitment to a shared 
position on a Westphalian sovereignty model extremely difficult. Given that, as noted above, this has been one 
of the few areas of commonality between Russia and the other BRICS states, the prospects for future 
cooperation between Russia and other members are unclear.   
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Conclusion  
In response to a hegemon-led shift in the sovereignty norm and concerns about Western threats to Russia’s 
position as regional power, a dual approach to sovereignty, evident throughout the post-Soviet period, has 
become an increasingly significant feature of Russian foreign policy. Though never acknowledged as such by 
actors, two sovereignty models are clearly evident in Russian governmental discourse and practice. In speaking 
about the basis of international order at a global level; in relation to states outside the area of the former Soviet 
Union; and in relation to Russia itself, Russia has maintained a strong commitment to a Westphalian model of 
sovereignty, acting as the most vocal defender of state sovereignty as the foundational principle of international 
relations. Inside the former Soviet space, however, a ‘post-Soviet’ approach has operated, in which state 
sovereignty is regarded as porous in relation to Russia while remaining impermeable in relation to states outside 
the region – an approach that is often justified by the Russian government using the same language of popular 
sovereignty, self-determination, and responsibility to protect that it rejects elsewhere. 
 
This dual approach reflects the instrumental character of the idea of sovereignty in Russian foreign policy. The 
sovereignty principle appears to have three functions: to secure national interests on key domestic, regional, and 
international issues; to balance against the West in general and the US in particular; and to act as a marker of 
emerging power identity. To date, this has proved to be a broadly successful approach, particularly as a means 
of balancing against the West and securing national interests; in both these areas, the differentiated approach to 
sovereignty has been helpful in securing Russian regional influence and interests while pursuing objectives at 
the international level.  
 
However, if the tensions between the two models proved to be productive for Russian foreign policy in the short 
term, and in relation to the first two of these objectives, they appear problematic for the third – membership of 
the club of emerging powers in a post-hegemonic, multipolar order. The strain placed on normative 
commonality with fellow BRICS members is problematic for Russia not just because it raises significant 
questions about its already-ambiguous place in the ‘emerging powers’ category, but also because this in turn 
affects the long-term prospects for its other objectives, notably the maintenance of its international position as a 
great power and the ability to effectively engage in balancing against the US and its European allies. The dual 
Russian approach to sovereignty as a means of advancing foreign policy objectives thus increasingly appears to 
be caught by a self-defeating logic. Russian status as a great power relies, as is true for other second tier states, 
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on its role as a regional power. A desire to protect this position from Western challenges and from threats 
deriving from governmental changes in the region has encouraged a more explicit and coercive application of 
the post-Soviet approach to sovereignty. This, however, is likely to have consequences for Russia’s international 
position, which rests, in part, on its membership of the non-Western, ‘emerging powers’ group that is 
characterised by a commitment to the Westphalian sovereignty model. Given the extent to which both 
approaches have been embedded in Russian foreign policy discourse and practice, and in Russian identity as a 
regional and (thus) globally powerful state, change in relation to either appears unlikely. The retention of this 
dual approach, however, may continue to damage both relations with the West and Russian foreign policy 
interests, not least in relation to China. 
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